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Abstract 
Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that 
judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and 
that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even given up. Here 
we put one of the main proponent’s account of why philosophical cases may cause the 
unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought 
experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly “disturbing 
characteristics” of philosophical cases.   
 
1 Introduction 
The use of judgements in so-called ‘cases’ or thought experiments in philosophical 
theorizing has recently come under severe attack: there is now a host of studies showing 
that the ‘case judgements’ by the folk and even by professional philosophers vary with 
extraneous demographic and presentation variables.1 Proponents of the ‘negative 
program’ of experimental philosophy argue that the method of cases ought to be strongly 
constrained or even given up entirely because case judgments are not considered reliable 
evidence for philosophical theorizing (Alexander and Weinberg 2007, Knobe and Nichols 
2017, Machery 2017).   
 In what probably constitutes the most extensive and systematic treatment within 
the negative program, Machery (2017) has claimed that philosophical cases exhibit three 
types of “disturbing characteristics” which, he believes, are likely to cause the unreliability 
of case judgments: cases are (i) unusual, (ii) pull apart properties that usually go together, 
                                               
1 Those results are conveniently summarized in chapter 2 of Machery (2017). 
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and (iii) contain superficial content irrelevant to the philosophical point in question.2 Cases 
are unusual, according to Machery, “if and only if we encounter it infrequently or if we 
rarely read texts about it” (113). Trolley cases, for example, are unusual in that subjects are 
asked to decide over other lives; something that most subjects would not have had to 
consider at any time during their normal lives. Philosophical cases, according to Machery, 
also pull apart properties that go together in everyday life. For example, in the footbridge 
case, subjects are asked to engage in physical violence in order to do more good than 
harm, although violence usually causes more harm than good (116). In Gettier cases, 
subjects cannot rely on their usual strategies for identifying knowledge, as such cases pull 
apart properties epistemologists have identified as crucial for knowledge attributions (e.g. 
safety and adherence). Lastly, philosophical cases are often described in “vivid terms”, 
contain “many irrelevant narrative elements”, and are presented in a “tendentious 
manner” (119). Machery believes that any of these three characteristics can individually 
cause the unreliability of case judgements (112). 
Machery doesn’t claim to be in possession of any direct evidence for the three 
disturbing characteristics in fact causing the unreliability of case judgements. For example, 
he is not able to provide any evidence that the pulling apart of properties in trolley actually 
causes subjects’ susceptibility to order effects. Yet, Machery is fairly confident that the 
characteristics he identifies to be “likely culprits” on the basis of his having provided “good 
explanations of why the judgements examined by experimental philosophers are influenced 
by demographic and presentation variables” (112; added emphasis).    
 How could one go about testing Machery’s claims about the characteristics of cases 
being disturbing? It is good practice in science to test hypotheses not only on the basis of 
the evidence which they were constructed for, but also with evidence that lies outside of 
their original domain of application. This avoids the suspicion of the hypothesis being 
gerrymandered to the evidence at hand and to actually get at something real (Worrall 
2002). Similarly, in philosophizing it is good practice to probe the claims of one’s 
interlocutor by testing them against examples that satisfy the conditions set out by one’s 
interlocutor but which were not considered and which might possess features which are 
                                               
2 Machery emphasizes that not every case must exhibit all of these three features in order to cause the 
unreliability of case judgements, nor does he claim that any of the characteristics necessitate unreliability. He 
only believes that they make unreliability more likely (112).  
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capable of challenging one’s interlocutor’s claims. In this paper we apply this strategy to 
probe Machery’s claims about the disturbing characteristics of cases. The example which 
we think satisfies at these characteristics are thought experiments in physics.  
Thought experiments in physics, too, are “unusual” in Machery’s sense: they 
usually involve quite bizarre situations which we would not normally encounter. We, for 
example, do not frequently encounter situations in which we are asked to make a 
judgement about whether or not a cat trapped in a box in which it has a 50% chance to die, 
is either dead or alive upon opening the box. Thought experiments in physics also pull 
apart properties that usually go together: in the so-called Einstein’s elevator thought 
experiment, one is asked to consider the trajectory of falling objects in a gravitational field-
free space (usually we are surrounded by the gravitational field of the earth). And thought 
experiments in physics are also rich in superficial content which is irrelevant to the point 
under consideration. For example, in Galileo’s thought experiment of two connected 
falling objects, the precise weight of the two objects is irrelevant to the point under 
consideration (namely ) – so long as one body is suitably heavier than the other.3  
In this paper we therefore tested whether thought experiments in physics can be 
said to affect the reliability of judgments in a way that Machery claims thought 
experiments in philosophy affect the reliability of judgments. We found no evidence for 
this claim.  
 In Section 2 of this paper we present the methods used in our test of the hypothesis 
that physicists make more reliable case judgments than non-physicists. In Section 3, we 
present the results of our study. In Section 4 we address several objections against our 
results and interpretation. In Section 5 we draw our conclusion. 
2 Method 
What does it mean for a case judgement to be reliable? Machery provides the following 
definition: 
T, a psychological process outputting judgments, is reliable in environment E if and only if 
in E either T has the disposition to produce a large proportion of true judgments or, if T is an 
inferential process, T has the disposition to produce a large proportion of true judgments if 
                                               
3 We will discuss these and other thought experiments in detail later in the paper. See also Appendix 2 for a 
detailed description of the thought experiments we used. 
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its inputs are true. Reliability here is a dispositional property, and a process used only once 
can still be assessed for reliability. (Machery 2017, 96; added emphasis)4 
By implication, a judgement (generated by the relevant psychological process) is reliable if 
it is likely to be correct.5 For Machery, the method of cases constitutes an environment in 
which this condition is not satisfied and in which the generated judgements are unreliable. 
For Machery’s account about the disturbing characteristics to be correct, the following 
hypothesis would have to be rejected: 
(H1) Subjects are likely to make reliable judgements in thought experiments in physics. 
In order to test hypothesis 1 we decided to use subjects which seem prima facie most 
competent in making judgments in thought experiments in physics, namely physicists.  
How does one know whether a given judgement in a thought experiments in 
reliable? Machery (2017) unfortunately provides little guidance here; he only focuses on 
conditions under which case judgements are off. But they must be off with regard to some 
standard. Horvath and Wiegmann (2015) provide a solution: they propose to use the 
textbook consensus about case judgments as a defeasible standard for gauging the 
reliability of the case judgements of our subjects. For thought experiments in physics, this 
standard is readily available (e.g. Brown and Fehige 2011). We shall use it here in the way 
suggested by Horvath and Wiegmann.    
 Machery’s account allows for another hypothesis. Machery believes that thought 
experiments are not only outside the “proper domain” of reliable judgements (112), but he 
also believes that philosophers have no special expertise in making case judgements. In 
other words, Machery seems to think that thought experiments are just as disturbing to 
the folk as they are to philosophers.  
The question of whether or not philosophers have an expertise in making case 
judgments has played an important role in debates between experimental philosophers 
and proponents of the traditional armchair method (Machery 2011, Williamson 2011). If 
philosophers do possess such expertise, then there would seem to be a case for not using 
                                               
4 Machery in the same place discusses other proposals for how to assess the epistemic credibility of case 
judgements (hopelessness and calibration), but provides arguments for why reliability is the best measure.  
5 Machery himself uses the predicate ‘reliable’/’unreliable’ for judgments throughout his book (Machery 
2017). At the same time, he doesn’t have much to say about the psychological processes generating the 
judgments and instead focuses on the characteristics of the environments in which, he believes, judgments 
become unreliable. We will turn to those in Section 3.2.  
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lay subjects but rather philosophers themselves when doing experiments on case 
judgements in philosophy. We tested whether the analogous idea would hold in thought 
experiments in physics: 
(H2) Physicists are more likely to make reliable judgements in thought experiments in 
physics than non-physicists. 
Of course, the reasons why physicists might be better than non-physicists could be 
different ones from the ones that could be brought to bear in the comparison between 
philosophers and non-philosophers. We will discuss this issue later on (Section 4).  
2.1 Materials 
We designed a set of six tasks. Each task consisted of a description of a thought 
experiment in physics, Phy-TE for short. Each task was also accompanied by a figure 
representing the Phy-TE, a comprehension question about the text, and a statement 
describing either the standard judgement about the thought experiment, or its negation. 
We chose six classical Phy-TE for our tasks, which are well known and discussed in the 
philosophy of science literature (Brown and Fehige 2011): Stevin’s chain, Schroedinger’s 
cat, Galileo’s tower, Galileo’s ship, and Newton’s cannon. These thought experiments are 
listed and explained in detail in Appendix 2. 
 The thought experiments we used seem to exhibit several of the features singled 
out in philosophical cases as causes for the unreliability of case judgments. Einstein’s 
elevator puts the reader into a highly ‘unusual’ situation of being dragged by a space ship 
through in an opaque container outer space. It’s also highly unusual for cats, for example, 
to be trapped in a box in which they are at risk of dying from the poisonous contents of a 
broken flask.  
Just like thought experiments in philosophy, many Phy-TE also pull apart properties 
that usually go together. For example, quantum properties are usually associated with 
micro-objects like electrons. Schroedinger’s cat asks us to consider a scenario in which 
quantum properties are assigned to the macro-object of a cat. Or consider Newton’s 
cannon: usually projectiles never have the speed that would be required for shooting an 
object into an orbit around the earth. Even thought experiments like Galileo’s tower can be 
said to be unusual: normally, unsupported bodies of different shape and size fall to the 
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ground at different speeds (contrary to what Galileo wanted to show) because their air 
resistance is different. 
Many Phy-TE also offer lots of ‘irrelevant narrative elements’ in what Machery calls 
‘superficial content’ of a thought experiment. For example, it is entirely irrelevant whether 
the cat in the box dies because a Geiger counter or some other device triggers the release of 
a toxin, or whether the toxin is contained in a flask that breaks. Likewise, it is quite 
irrelevant to Newton’s cannon whether the device used to shoot the object into an orbit 
around the earth is an (unrealistically powerful) cannon or an (unrealistically powerful) 
rocket launcher. It also doesn’t matter what the weight of the bodies used in Galileo’s 
tower thought experiment, so long one is significantly heavier than the other.  
2.2 Procedure 
The following procedure was used to test both H1 and H2. Participants were asked to 
carefully consider the thought experiment and answer two questions. The first question 
was a relatively simple comprehension question that asked participants to finish a 
statement about a relevant element of the scenario and was designed to probe whether 
they have understood the text. Only participants who answered the comprehension 
question correctly were included in our analysis. The comprehension questions were 
designed in such a way that they would not guide the participants towards the correct 
answers to the second question (see Appendix 2). 
The second question asked participants to what extent they agreed or disagreed 
with a statement expressing a judgment in the hypothetical scenario. In half of the tasks 
participants were asked to evaluate statements expressing a correct judgement, and in the 
other half of the tasks participants were asked to evaluate the statement expressing the 
negation of a correct judgement. The participants were asked to answer by indicating their 
level of agreement/disagreement on a five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = 
Somewhat disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Somewhat agree; 5 = Strongly 
agree. We measured those scores against the standard judgements reported in the 
literature on Phy-TE (Sklar 1992, Brown and Fehige 2011). For example, in the hypothetical 
scenario based on the Schrodinger’s cat thought experiment, subjects were asked to 
indicate to what extent they agreed/disagreed with the statement “Before the box is 
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opened the dog is either dead or alive”.6 The six tasks were presented randomly and were 
followed by a short questionnaire gathering (see next section). For details concerning tasks 
and their design see Appendix 2.  
2.3 Participants 
In our first experiment testing hypothesis 1, we recruited physicists (n = 57) via mailing 
lists for PhD students, postdocs and faculty members in various physics departments in 
<blinded for peer review>. We required that our subjects had a PhD degree or were 
studying towards one. The mean age of participants in the physics group was 33 (SD = 
10.2) of which 11 (19%) were female.7 Out of all 57 participants in this group, 32 (56.1%) 
reported having a PhD and 25 (43.9%) being enrolled in a PhD programme in physics (see 
Appendix 1 for specialisations).  
 For testing hypothesis 2 in our second experiment, we recruited non-physicists (n = 
60) via mailing lists for PhD students, postdocs and faculty members in various 
departments in science, social science, and humanities and excluding physics departments 
in <blinded for peer review> (see Appendix 1 for details). In order to rule out that a 
possible difference in task performance might be caused by different levels of education, 
we required a PhD or that subjects were studying towards one. The biggest subgroup of 
our subjects were political scientists (n=19). The mean age of participants in the control 
group was 34 (SD = 6.72). The control group consisted of 60 subjects of which 27 (47.3%) 
were female, 33 (57.9%) reported holding a PhD and 24 (42.1%) being enrolled in a PhD 
programme. The details regarding their education and areas of study are presented in 
Appendix 1. A background section located at the end of the questionnaire was used to 
collect information on participants’ education, age, gender, level of English, and area of 
specialisation.8  
                                               
6 In our experiment, we assumed that physicists would reject this judgement. See Section 3 and Appendix 2 
for further details.  
7 This reflects the unfortunate underrepresentation of women in physics (Sax et al. 2016) 
8 In total, 166 participants responded to our call and submitted their responses via the Qualtrics platform. 
Each participant had the option to leave their email address on an external Google Forms website in order to 
enter a lottery for 5 amazon.com vouchers of each $25 or to receive information about the results of the 
study. We excluded partly incomplete questionnaires (n = 29), subjects who did not satisfy our minimal 
criteria for education, i.e. not being enrolled in a PhD programme (n = 13), subjects who did not have at least 
an intermediate level of English (n=1), and subjects who did not answer the comprehension questions 
correctly (n=6). 
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3 Results and discussion 
In what follows we will first discuss the results of our experiments pertaining to H1 and 
then the results pertaining to H2. For both results we distinguished between a CORR 
(=correct) and a HCON (=highly confident) measure, whereby HCON is a count of strong 
agreements with the textbook consensus (or strong disagreements, when we presented 
statements negating the textbook consensus) and CORR is a count of both the “strongly 
agree/disagree” and the “somewhat agree/disagree” responses. 
3.1 Results pertaining to H1  
Out of our 6 tasks, physicists answered 4.30 tasks correctly on average in the CORR 
condition (SD=1.12) and 3.44 tasks in the HCON condition (SD=1.23). In other words, 
although physicists did fairly well, they clearly didn’t do perfectly. Could the “disturbing” 
characteristics of thought experiment explain the imperfect performance of physicists? In 
order to answer the question, we analyzed the performance of physicists for each task (see 
Table 1). In the next section we discuss whether these results can be explained by 
Machery’s idea of disturbing characteristics of thought experiments.  
  
 % CORR  % HCON 
Stevin’s chain 68.4 56.1 
Einstein’s elevator 59.6 50.9 
Schroedinger’s cat 26.3 14.0 
Newton’s cannon 82.3 57.9 
Galileo’s ship 94.7 70.2 
Galileo’s tower 98.2 94.7 
Table 1: percentages of correct responses in both the CORR and the HCON count for physicists. 
3.2 Can disturbing characteristics explain physicists’ varied performance? 
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, Machery believes that thought 
experiments are disturbing because they are (i) ‘unusual’, (ii) pull apart properties that 
usually go together and (iii) contain superficial content which is irrelevant to the point 
under consideration. We also mentioned that thought experiments in physics fulfil these 
characteristics. Schroedinger’s cat is not a scenario many people usually come across. We 
usually do not consider scenarios in which we are not subject to the influence of the 
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gravitational force. This is also because these scenarios pull apart properties that usually 
go together (such as our daily experience of a massive gravitational field exerted by the 
earth and us dropping an object and observing its trajectory). And as mentioned, thought 
experiments in physics also contain a lot of irrelevant detail: it matters little whether we 
consider a cat or a dog in Schroedinger’s thought experiment, whether the balls in 
Strevin’s chain are made of metal or marble, whether the two connected objects in 
Galileo’s thought experiment together weigh 10kg or a 100kg.  
Contrary what Machery claims about thought experiments in philosophy, the 
“disturbing characteristics” of thought experiments in our sample cannot explain why 
some judgements may be more reliable than others. Consider for example Stevin’s chain 
and Newton’s cannon. Whereas the former task seems to describe a perfectly normal 
scenario, the latter makes some rather outlandish assumptions about the power of 
cannons. In Newton’s cannon the properties of being an terrestrial projectile and having 
realistic terrestrial speed are pulled apart. In contrast, in Stevin’s chain it is hard to see 
which properties are supposed to come apart that usually go together. So if anything, 
Newton’s cannon should be more disturbing than Stevin’s chain. And yet, physicists did 
much better in Newton’s cannon than they did in Stevin’s chain.  
It also appears that different characteristics of thought experiments can pull in 
different directions. For example, Schroedinger’s cat is unusual in that cats are usually not 
situated like that. On the other hand, it may be fairly familiar to physicists. So is it unusual 
or not? Lastly, with regard to the third of Machery’s criteria, all of our tasks, by virtue of 
being thought experiments, contain ‘irrelevant narrative details’. It’s not easy to see how 
they would be more disturbing in some tasks rather than others. 
 In sum, the characteristics of thought experiments that Machery has identified as 
disturbing cannot account for the imperfect and varied performance of physicists. It thus 
seems unlikely that they play the negative role that Machery has identified for them.  
3.3 Results pertaining to H2  
In order to test our hypothesis that physics experts are more likely to judge Phy-TEs 
correctly than non-physicists, we conducted the same test that we used for the physicists 
with non-physicists. We then determined with a t-test whether the difference in the means 
of the number of correct judgements by physics experts and the non-physicists was 
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significant for any of these two counts. For both counts, our H2 was confirmed: physicists 
on average judged about one more task correctly than the non-physicists in the CORR 
count and about one-and-a-half task more in the HCON count (see Table 2). The effect 
sizes for the CORR and HCON count are “large” and “very large”, respectively, on the 
scale suggested by Hyde (2005) and endorsed by Machery (2017).9  
 
Table 2: Average number of correctly answered tasks by physicists and non-physicists out of a total of six 
tasks. 
Since physicists are clearly more reliable than non-physicists in making judgments in Phy-
TE, it is not the case that thought experiments constitute environments in which it is 
unlikely that expertise can be had—contrary to what Machery has argued. 
We also conducted negative binomial regression analysis to test for the influence of 
gender, age, response duration, exposure of controls to physics at university, and level of 
English (see Appendix 4). None of these factors was significant. That means that the 
difference we found between the performance of the physicists and the non-physicists 
cannot be accounted for by at least one of the extraneous factors which have been reported 
to influence case judgements in the experimental philosophy literature, namely gender 
(Buckwalter and Stich 2014) (but see Starmans and Friedman 2012, Adleberg et al. 2015, 
Seyedsayamdost 2015).  
  Finally, we also analyzed our lay subjects’ performance in each of the six tasks: 
Table 5 lists the percentages of correct judgements for each thought experiment for both 
CORR and HCON, for both physicists and non-physicists, for comparison. It also lists 
whether the difference between expert and layperson judgements was significant, which 
we determined with a chi-squared test (see Table 9 in Appendix 3 for further details).  
 
 % correct in CORR p % correct in HCON p 
 Physicists Non-physicists  Physicists Non-physicists  
                                               
9 Cohen’s d is 0.79 for CORR and 1.08 for HCON.  
   Physicists, mean SD Non-Physicists, mean SD P t 
CORR 4.30 1.12 3.37 1.24 .000 -4.22 
HCON  3.44 1.23 2.02 1.40 .000 -5.89 
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Stevin’s chain 68.4 59.6 ns 56.1 38.6 ns 
Einstein’s elevator 59.6 54.4 ns 50.9 31.6 * 
Schroedinger’s cat 26.3 10.3 * 14.0 7.0 ns 
Newton’s cannon 82.3 68.4 ns 57.9 24.6 *** 
Galileo’s ship 94.7 66.6 *** 70.2 42.1 ** 
Galileo’s tower 98.2 77.2 ** 94.7 57.9 *** 
Table 3: percentages of correct responses in both the CORR and the HCON count for both physicists and 
non-physicists. Statistically significant differences from our c2 test at the 95% level are marked with a star (*), 
at the 99% level (i.e., p < 0.01) with a double-star (**) and at the 99.9% level (i.e., p < 0.001)  with a triple-star 
(***). See Table 9 in Appendix 3 for details regarding the tests.  
Again, as mentioned in the previous section, Stevin’s chain should not be very disturbing 
to subjects (because it does not seem to pull apart properties that usually go together), 
non-physicists got it wrong more often than Newton’s cannon, for example, which seems 
much more disturbing by Machery’s standards. It’s also worth mentioning that 
Schroedinger’s cat again stands out from the other tasks in that most subjects in both 
groups answered contrary to our expectation. This calls for an explanation.   
3.4 The oddball of Schroedinger’s cat 
Before we will try to elucidate the oddball of Schroedinger’s cat, let us first provide some 
further background on the original motivation for this thought experiment, which shaped 
our expectation of how subjects would respond to this thought experiment.  
Schrödinger used his thought experiment to challenge Bohr and Heisenberg’s 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schroedinger’s reasoning was that if 
the Copenhagen interpretation were correct, then the cat in the box (in our case: a dog) 
should be in a state of superposition before the opening of the box (the “measurement”) 
causes a collapse of the wavefunction. However, since we would under normal 
circumstances judge that the cat/dog does have a definite state before we open the box, the 
Copenhagen interpretation must be false. Since the Copenhagen interpretation is indeed 
by far the most accepted interpretation amongst physicists10, we expected physicists to 
‘bite the bullet’ and accept that the cat/dog actually is in a state of superposition.11 It 
turned out, however, that although physicists judged this way significantly more often 
                                               
10 For a survey see Schlosshauer et al. (2013). 
11 We were influenced by a standard textbook in the philosophy of physics (Sklar 1992, 184). 
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than the folk, most physicists instead made a judgment in accordance with the more 
‘common sensical’ assessment. They therefore presumably rejected that the Copenhagen 
interpretation (contrary to what Schroedinger thought) entails the judgement that the 
cat/dog must be in a state of superposition. From our pilots, we gathered that physicists 
did this on the basis of making a distinction between micro-objects such as electrons and 
macro-objects, such as cats and dogs. We take it that such a distinction can be made within 
the Copenhagen interpretation on the basis of Bohr’s correspondence principle, which 
says (roughly) that the predictions of quantum mechanics approximate those of classical 
mechanics when it comes to classical objects (such as cats and dogs).  
Another reason why physicists did not answer in agreement with our expectations 
may have to do with the way we phrased our question. The sentence we presented them 
was: “Before the box is opened the dog is either dead or alive.” Our expectation was that 
physicists would judge this statement incorrect, because we took the Copenhagen 
interpretation to imply that the dog is neither dead nor alive, but rather in a state of 
superposition. But possibly, physicists parsed the exclusive XOR as a simple OR.  
We should note that even when reversing the scales for our Schroedinger cat task so 
that (strong) agreement with the presented judgement is assumed to be correct (instead of 
incorrect as in our original analysis), our hypothesis would remain confirmed (see Table 
4). The effect sizes for the CORR and HCON count are “moderate” and “large”, 
respectively, on the scale embraced by Machery (2017, 46).12 
 
   Physicists, mean SD Non-Physicists, mean SD P t 
CORR 4.60 .979 4 1.363 .003 -2.68 
HCON  3.86 1.187 2.68 1.549 .000 -4.55 
Table 4: Average of correctly answered questions out of a total of six tasks, with the scale for the 
Schroedinger cat reversed (p < .001 for HCON and p < .005 for CORR).  
At the same time, it should be pointed out that this scale reversal would result in the non-
physicists answering correctly more often than the physicists (see Table 5). This would 
make the Schroedinger cat the only of our six tasks in which this would be the case. 
                                               
12 Cohen’s d is 0.51 for CORR and 0.86 for HCON.  
 13 
 
 % correct in CORR % correct in HCON 
 Physicists Non-physicists Physicists Non-physicists 
Schroedinger’s cat 
(reversed scales) 
66.7 82.5 56.1 73.7 
Table 5: Percentages of correct answers for Schroedinger’s cat with reversed scales in both CORR and 
HCON. CORR: Χ2 (1, 114) =3.746 (p=.053); HCON: Χ2 (1, 114) =3.851 (p=.050). 
One may ask again: can the disturbing characteristics of Schroedinger’s cat explain the 
result? It looks as though most physicists and non-physicists judged the highly unusual 
scenario of the thought experiment in a way that one would usually judge a midsized 
object like a cat. Thus, if the characteristics of thought experiments are disturbing at all, 
then they don’t seem to be very disturbing in this case.   
4 Objections 
In this section we consider four objections to our results and our interpretation: (i) that we 
did not create the right circumstances to test the adverse effects of thought experiments, 
(ii) that physicists did fairly well in our tasks (and better than non-physicists) simply 
because they recalled the tasks, and (iii) that physicists’ performance is entirely explained 
by them being in possession of the correct physical principles.   
4.1 Objection 1: not the right contexts? 
An objection one may raise against the interpretation of our results may be that we didn’t 
create the right contexts for bringing out the adverse effects of thought experiments in 
judgments. In particular, we didn’t produce contexts in which we could detect any 
presentation effects, such as order of presentation, and we did not test subjects different 
backgrounds, e.g., from different cultural backgrounds.  
 There are three things we have to say about this objection. First, Machery’s claim 
about thought experiments being not the proper domain of reliable judgments is an 
unqualified claim, i.e., Machery does not claim that judgements in thought experiments 
are unreliable only in circumstances in which one tests for the effects of presentation or 
demographic variables. On the contrary, Machery views thought experiments with 
disturbing characteristics as intrinsically adverse environments for reliable judgments. He 
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just thinks that experiments investigating the effects of presentation and demographic 
variables create contexts in which those adverse effects come out most clearly.  
 Second, we take it that the dialectical situation is such that it is for the armchair 
critics, and not for us, to demonstrate the effects of extraneous variables on judgements in 
thought experiments also in physics. Third, even if armchair critics would accept their 
burden of proof and seek to demonstrate that judgements in Phy-TE are influenced by 
extraneous variables in the way case judgements of the folk allegedly are, we remain 
confident. In order for armchair critics to show that judgments in thought experiments 
with disturbing characteristics are outside the proper domain of any subjects, physicists 
would have be shown to vulnerable to the effects of extraneous variables to such an extent 
that the difference in reliability between the folk and the experts is nullified.   
4.2 Objection 2: just recall? 
In response to our results, one could speculate that physicists did fairly well (and better 
than the folk) simply because they recalled the correct solutions that they’ve been drilled 
into. The difference that we found between the folk and the physicists could therefore not 
be interpreted as a sign for the higher level of expertise of physicists in making 
judgements in thought experiments (contrary to what we suggested here).   
There are several reasons against this interpretation. First, our thought experiments 
are not a very salient part of physicists’ training and don’t occupy very prominent role in 
textbooks. If physicists’ performance is best explained by their recall abilities, then their 
performance probably should have been worse than it actually turned out to be. Second, if 
physicists just recalled the correct textbook answers, then – everything being equal – their 
performance should be more uniform across the tasks, unless it could be shown that the 
thought experiments with worse performance occur less frequently in physicists’ training 
than the thought experiments in which our subjects do better. It would be for the critics to 
support this implication. Finally, as already mentioned, physicists answered the 
Schroedinger cat thought experiment contrary to what one would expect based on the 
textbook consensus. This is a problem for the recall hypothesis.  
4.3 Objection 3: better physical knowledge? 
One may accept our results but deny that they have any implications for thought 
experiments in philosophy. The reason that physicists are more reliable than the folk, the 
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objection continues, can be fully explained by the fact that Phy-TE require the knowledge 
of correct physical principles, whereas that is not the case in philosophical cases. Our 
results indicate, however, that this is not the case.  
First of all, physicists’ performance was not perfect: there was a substantial number 
of physicists who did not answer according to our expectations based on the textbook 
consensus. So if their better performance was fully determined by their better knowledge 
of the relevant physical principles, their grasp of those principles wasn’t as good as one 
might expect – particularly given that the tasks were not very demanding in that regard: 
most of the tasks required only a basic understanding of classical mechanics. Second, if 
performance really was fully determined by the possession of correct principles, one 
should expect it to be harder for non-physicists to get right tasks that require more 
knowledge of physical principles than tasks which require less knowledge of physical 
principles. Three of our six tasks require some very basic knowledge of classical physics 
(Stevin’s chain, Galileo’s ship, Newton’s cannon). Although the difference between expert 
and lay judgements is statistically significant in some tasks (Galileo’s ship in CORR and 
HCON; Newton’s cannon in HCON), there is no difference in others (Stevin’s chain in 
both CORR and HCON; Newton’s cannon in CORR). On the other hand, tasks in which 
physicists should have had no major advantage, non-physicists did much poorer than 
physicists. In particular, Galileo’s tower, although an application of classical physics at 
first sight, is in fact simply a reductio ad absurdum; no knowledge of physics is required. 
Still, there is a marked difference between the judgements of physicists and non-physicists 
in both of our count categories.  
 Turn now to the two tasks which arguably require more advanced knowledge in 
physics than the other four tasks, namely Schroedinger’s cat and Einstein’s elevator. In the 
latter task, there was no significant difference in the CORR count, but there is a significant 
difference in the HCON count at the 95% level. In the former task, there was a significant 
difference in the CORR (also at the at the 95% level) but not in the HCON count. Thus, 
even though the difference between expert and lay judgements should be most 
pronounced if it were true that the difference is to be explained in terms of the advanced 
knowledge of physicists, it is either not as pronounced as in other tasks (for example as in 
Galileo’s tower, which is significant at the 99% level) or it doesn’t exist in the first place.  
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In sum, knowledge of the correct physical principles does not fully determine 
subjects’ judgements in Phy-TE. In particular, physicists did not do much better than non-
physicists in tasks that would seem to require more physical knowledge than other tasks. 
Phy-TE and philosophical cases may be more similar than the objection would have it.  
5 Conclusion 
Our first experiment shows that physicists are reliable when making judgements in 
thought experiments in physics; they don’t seem to be disturbed by the characteristics 
identified by Machery as intrinsically problematic. This, at least to some extent, 
undermines Machery’s far-reaching skepticism of the method of cases.  
Our second experiment shows that physicists are more reliable than non-physicists 
when it comes to making judgements in thought experiments in physics. This undermines 
Machery’s idea that thought experiments constitute environments in which no expertise is 
possible. Furthermore, we believe that the results of our second experiment lend support 
to what has come to be known as the expertise defense in philosophy: trained experts make 
more reliable judgments than the folk. This idea has been used to argue that empirical 
results demonstrating the unreliability of case judgements by the folk have no bearing on 
whether or not case judgments by philosophers can be used as (defeasible) evidence in 
philosophical theorizing (Hales 2006, Ludwig 2007, Horvath 2010, Devitt 2011, Williamson 
2011).13 The expertise defense is usually motivated by an analogy to judgments by 
philosophers in thought experiments and expert judgments in mathematics, physics, and 
linguistics, but the analogy has been criticized (Nado 2014, 2015). It may well be that an 
analogy between philosophers’ case judgements and physicists’ judgements in thought 
experiments in physics fairs much better. But this remains to be argued in detail 
elsewhere.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
PHYSICS CONTROL p 
Background information N = 57 N = 57  
Age (in years) 33 (10.02) 34 (6.72) ns 
Gender (female) 11 (19%) 27 (47.3%) * 
Holds a PhD 32 (56.1%) 33 (57.9%) ns 
Enrolled in a PhD programme 25 (43.9%) 24 (42.1%) ns 
Table 6: Background information about all participants and their education (p=.001). 
 
 
Holds a PhD in:  N = 33 
Anthropology 2 
Chemistry 2 
Economics 1 
Engineering 1 
History 4 
Languages 1 
Literature 1 
Mathematics 1 
Medicine 2 
Musicology 1 
Political science  11 
Psychology 1 
Philosophy 3 
Sociology 2 
Enrolled in a PhD programme N = 24 
Business & managements 2 
Computer Science  2 
History 1 
Linguistics  2 
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Literature 1 
Mathematics 4 
Medicine 1 
Political science 8 
Psychology 2 
Table 7: Information about the education of participants from the CONTROL group. 
 
Specialization in PHYSICS group Number of participants who chose the answer 
Astrophysics and cosmology 9 
Atomic- molecular- and optical physics 24 
Biophysics 1 
Solid-state- and materials physics  11 
Sub-atomic physics 8 
Nano physics 8 
Statistical physics 5 
Other* 11 
Table 8: Areas of specialisation of physicists via self-identification (multiple answers allows). Under “Other” 
subjects stated: Particle physics (3); Quantum physics (4); Fluid mechanics (1); Condensed matter physics (1); 
Nuclear physics (1) Applied physics and methodology (1). 
 
Appendix 2 
In our six tasks, we asked subjects to consider a scenario (S), answer a comprehension 
question (CS), and say whether they would agree with the judgements offered (J).   
 
Stevin’s chain 
S: “Imagine that somebody put a chain with evenly spaced metal balls with the same size 
and weight on top of an inclined frictionless plane.” 
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CS: “The inclined plane in the above scenario is …” 
J: “Once the chain is released it will move sideways.” [This is incorrect.] 
 
J is the negation of the judgment elicited in a famous thought experiment by Simon Stevin. 
With this thought experiment Stevin wanted to demonstrate the plausibility of his claim 
that for inclined planes with the same height, the force needed to keep weights in their 
position on those planes varies inversely with the planes’ lengths. More specifically, in the 
depicted scenario S Stevin used a pair of planes of which one was double the length of the 
other and the weights placed on the longer plane were double the amount of weights on 
the shorter plane. According to his law, the weights on those two planes (which are 
connected to each other) should balance each other out. In order to drive home the point, 
Stevin connected the weights on those two planes with a chain of further weights (seen at 
the bottom of the figure). Now, if one were to deny Stevin’s ‘law’ and approve of the 
statement that the entire chain moves to the right or to the left (as in J), it’s not clear how 
one could deny that the chain keeps moving either to the right or left. After all, the chain is 
uniform (equal weights, equal distances between the weights). But since this would 
constitute a perpetual motion, which is ruled out by the 2nd law of thermodynamics. Ernst 
Mach, who discussed this task in his The Science of Mechanics, ruled this out on an 
“instinctive basis”.  
 
Galileo’s ships 
S: “Imagine yourself standing at the coast and observing a ship moving with constant 
speed. The picture shows a snapshot of the ship’s movement at two points in time: t1 and 
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t2. At t1, a cannon ball is dropped from the top of the mast of the ship and at t2 the cannon 
ball has reached its final position:” 
 
CS: “As the observer you are located on …” 
J: “When seen from the coast, the trajectory of the ball moving from t1 to t2 is as in the 
following picture:”  [This is correct] 
 
Galileo used this thought experiment in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of the 
World to persuade those believing in the geocentric system that a moving earth would not 
necessarily pose any problems for terrestrial physics (people were concerned that a 
moving earth would imply objects on earth flying through the air). The object falling from 
the top of the mast to its bottom on a moving ship illustrates that the trajectory of falling 
objects may appear straight when it in fact decomposes into straight and rectilinear 
motion (as in our second picture). Galileo’s ship also demonstrates what has come to be 
known as Galilean relativity: the classical laws of physics are the same in all inertial 
frames (and two inertial frames can be transformed into each other via Galilean 
transformations).   
 
Newton’s cannonball 
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S: “Imagine shooting a cannonball from a high elevation on earth into the distance. On the 
picture, you see the trajectories of a cannonball shot with (relatively) low speed, A, and 
with a higher speed, B. Cannon balls following A and B will land back on earth.” 
 
CS: “The cannonball following trajectory B will land on …” 
J: “Trajectory C is possible.” [This is correct] 
 
Newton used this thought experiment in the The System of the World to show that the 
orbital motion of the moon (and the planets around the sun) is accounted for by the same 
forces that act on earth (namely an inertial and a gravitational one).  
 
Galileo’s tower 
S: “Imagine you connect a steel ball of 10kg and a steel ball of 5kg with a tight chain and 
drop the combined object from a high elevation in a vacuum. How does one determine the 
speed of fall of the combined object? One proposal is to average the speed of the two 
objects (when they fall separately): since 5kg falls slower than 10kg, the combined object 
will fall slower than the 10kg ball. Another proposal is to add the weights: and since 15kg 
> 10kg, the combined object will fall quicker. Yet another proposal is that the combined 
object falls just as fast as the 10kg ball on its own, since the weight makes no difference to 
the speed of fall.” 
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CS: “The combined object weighs …. kg.” 
J: “The combined object will land just as fast on the ground as the 10 kg steel ball alone”. 
[This is correct] 
 
This is another thought experiment by Galileo, expounded in his Dialogues concerning two 
new sciences. Galileo used this thought experiment to demonstrate an internal 
contradiction in Aristotle’s physics, according to which heavier bodies fall quicker to the 
ground than lighter ones: in situations such as the one described, Aristotelian physics 
implies a contradiction, namely that both the combined object falls quicker and slower 
than the heavy object alone. On the basis of this thought experiment (and other evidence), 
Galileo argued not only that Aristotelian physics is false, but also that all bodies fall at the 
same rate (which he could not demonstrate at the time, as he had no means for producing 
vacuums).  
 
Einstein’s Elevator 
S: “Consider a person in the scenarios A and B. In A, the person is standing inside an 
elevator that sits on the ground level. In B, the person is inside an elevator that is dragged 
through empty space somewhere in the universe with uniform acceleration (i.e., the speed 
increases constantly). In neither A or B can the person see what's going on outside the 
elevator. In B, the person does not feel that the elevator is being dragged: the elevator 
appears perfectly stable to her. Suppose that the person wants to find out whether she is in 
A or B by dropping a ball to the floor.” 
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CS: “In B, the elevator is dragged through…” 
J: “The person can determine whether she is in A or B by the manner in which the ball 
drops to the floor.” [This is incorrect] 
 
Einstein (and Infeld) used this thought experiment to illustrate the equivalence between 
inertial and gravitational forces, which underlies the general theory of relativity. The 
trajectories of the balls will only then be indistinguishable in the two scenarios if the 
acceleration equals the strength of gravity on the surface of the earth. This is suggested in 
the thought experiment by the person in the elevator “not feeling” any drag.  
 
Schrödinger’s cat 
S: “Imagine a dog trapped in an opaque box. There is a very small amount of radioactive 
substance in the box: there is a probability of 50% that one atom of that substance decays 
within one hour. Whenever one atom of this substance decays, a Geiger counter will detect 
this atom and trigger the destruction of a flask containing a highly toxic substance. As 
soon as the flask breaks, the dog dies instantly. Suppose that the dog is kept in the box for 
one hour before the box is opened.” 
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CS: “If one atom decays, then the dog will …” 
J: “Before the box is opened the dog is either dead or alive.” [Our expectation was that 
physicists should judge this as incorrect] 
 
Erwin Schrödinger used this thought experiment to challenge Bohr and Heisenberg’s 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
The wave function of quantum mechanics describes the system in terms of 
probabilities. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, the probability of the state of a 
physical system at some point in time describes the actual system and is not just an 
expression of our own ignorance. The system is also said to be in a “superposition” of 
states. When we measure the system is said to “collapse” and the system adopts a definite 
state. Which state the system actually adopts upon measurement, however, cannot be 
determined within quantum mechanics.   
Schroedinger’s reasoning was that if the Copenhagen interpretation were correct, 
then the cat in the box (in our case: a dog) should be in a state of superposition before the 
opening of the box (the “measurement”) causes a collapse of the wavefunction. However, 
since we would normally judge that the cat/dog does have a definite state before we open 
the box, the Copenhagen interpretation must be false. As explained in the main text, there 
are legitimate ways of avoiding this conclusion. In our analysis we presumed that the 
correct response in this task would be the denial of J (but see above).  
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Appendix 3 
Question-by-question chi-square tests in the HCON count for correctly answered 
questions by physicists vs. non-physicists.  
 CORR HCON 
 Χ2 p Χ2 p 
Stevin’s chain Χ2 (1, 114) =0.9522 .329 Χ2 (1, 114) =3.5185 .061 
Einstein’s elevator Χ2 (1, 114) =0.3221 .570 Χ2 (1, 114) =4.3804 .036* 
Schroedinger’s cat Χ2 (1, 114) =4.7281 .030* Χ2 (1, 114) =1.4902 .222 
Newton’s cannon Χ2 (1, 114) =3.0299 .082 Χ2 (1, 114) =12.0689 .000*** 
Galileo’s ship Χ2 (1, 114) =14.4190 .000*** Χ2 (1, 114) =9.1200 .003** 
Galileo’s tower Χ2 (1, 114) =11.75257 .001** Χ2 (1, 114) =21.4023 .000*** 
Table 9: Chi-square tests in the HCON and CORR count comparing physicists and non-physicists for each of 
our thought experiments. Statistically significant differences at the 95% level (i.e., p < 0.05) are marked with a 
star (*) at the 99% level (i.e., p < 0.01) with a double-star (**) and at the 99.9% level (i.e., p < 0.001) with a 
triple-star (***).  
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Appendix 4 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Strictly Correct 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Physics (dichotomous) 0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.49* 
(0.13) 
0.41** 
(0.15) 
Marginal Effect of Physics 
(How many more questions 
do physicists get right on 
average) 
1.45*** 1.34*** 1.52** if 
female 
1.22** if 
non-female 
Physics * Female   0.27 
(0.28) 
Exposure to physics at 
university (but no bachelor 
degree) (dichotomous) 
 0.19 
(0.25) 
0.16 
(0.25) 
Age  0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Female  -0.31* 
(0.14) 
-0.44* 
(0.20) 
Natural log of duration 
(seconds) 
 -0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.004 
(0.07) 
Degree of English 
proficiency (1=intermediate, 
2=advanced, 3=native) 
 -0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.12 
(0.13) 
Constant 0.670*** 
(0.09) 
0.97*** 
(0.59) 
0.99 
(0.59) 
Log Likelihood -198 -194 -194 
Ln_Alpha -27.09 -27.09 -27.09 
Alpha 1.71 e-12 1.71 e-12 1.71 e-12 
Table 10: Negative binomial regression analysis for the HCON count. According to Model 1 the marginal 
effect of having a PhD degree in physics (or studying towards one) is 1.45. Thus, having a physics degree is 
predicted to increase the number of questions answered correctly by 1.45. Model 2 includes control variables 
for gender, exposure of controls to physics at university, age, duration of task performance, and level of 
English. Model 3 interacts the factor ‘women’ with physicists and non-physicists. It predicts that women 
with a PhD degree in physics (or ones studying towards one) judge 1.52 tasks more correctly than women in 
the control group.  *denotes p < 0.05 (95% statistically significant); ** denotes p < 0.01 (99% statistically 
significant); *** denotes p < 0.001 (99.9% statistically significant). Numbers in the table represent the 
difference in the logs of expected counts in the response variable for a one-unit change in the independent 
variable. 
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Dependent Variable: Total Lax Correct 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Physics (dichotomous) 0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.23* 
(0.11) 
0.22 
(0.13) 
Marginal Effect of Physics 
(How many more questions 
do physicists get right on 
average) 
0.93* 0.89* 0.79 if 
female 
0.91 if non-
female 
Physics * Female   0.01 
(0.23) 
Exposure to physics at 
university (but no bachelor 
degree) (dichotomous) 
 0.23 
(0.19) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
Age  -0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Female  -0.18 
(0.11) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
Natural log of duration 
(seconds) 
 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Degree of English 
proficiency (1=intermediate, 
2=advanced, 3=native) 
 -0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
Constant 0.21*** 
(0.07) 
1.14* 
(0.49) 
1.14* 
(0.49) 
Log Likelihood -203 -201 -201 
Ln_Alpha -21.47 -21.47 -21.47 
Alpha 4.75 e-10 4.75 e-10 4.75 e-10 
Table 11: Negative binomial regression analysis for the CORR count. According to Model 1 the marginal 
effect of having a PhD degree in physics (or studying towards one) is 0.93. Model 2 includes control 
variables for gender, exposure of controls to physics at university, age, duration of task performance, and 
level of English. Model 3 interacts the factor ‘women’ with physicists and non-physicists. It predicts that 
women with a PhD degree in physics (or ones studying towards one) judge .89 tasks more correctly than 
women in the control group. *denotes p < 0.05 (95% statistically significant); ** denotes p < 0.01 (99% 
statistically significant); *** denotes p < 0.001 (99.9% statistically significant). Numbers in the table represent 
the difference in the logs of counts in the response variable for a one-unit change in the independent 
variable. 
